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Josh Lauer wrote a very timely book. Recent mass hacking of consumer data from major retailers and 
repeated leaks of millions of files from Equifax, as well as more recent – and sinister – revelations of 
stealth data harvesting by Facebook and other tech companies made it very clear that individual 
consumer identities are valuable raw material for the data broker industry; yet we can neither control 
what goes in, nor how and by whom it is used. In what Lauer calls a modern version of a Faustian 
bargain, we submit to constant surveillance and acquiesce to giving up personal information in exchange 
for accessing various, often “free” content, memberships and services.  
Lauer’s focus is on how this informational-industrial complex came to be, from its inception to the 
present. The book is a true tour-de-force: it spans close to two centuries of detailed history with the 
earliest references dating back to the 1830s. It is thoroughly documented, and takes us behind the scene 
of the powerful and secretive industry. It turns the tables on the very companies that managed to 
transform disparate information about individuals into a marketable commodity, by selling it first to 
lenders for the purpose of evaluating borrowers, and then to retailers for the purpose of segmenting 
consumer markets and identifying desirable high spenders. 
Lauer wants to set the record straight where it has been pretty muddled: despite the commonly held 
beliefs about the role of technology, pervasive consumer surveillance and financial identity of today are 
not a result of the post-1960s rise in computer algorithms and database storage capacities. In fact, they 
are not 20th century inventions at all. As Lauer persuasively and painstakingly demonstrates, they have 
deep-seated roots, and are largely coterminous with the development of consumer credit, itself the 
product of the 19th rather than 20th century. Drawing on rich historical accounts, Lauer reveals that the 
first organizations devoted to consumer reporting were founded in New York in 1870, and by 1890, they 
spread to many cities across the nation, including all the way to California. The capacity of these early 
organizations with respect to consumer surveillance  varied greatly: some merely produced basic 
blacklists of borrowers who defaulted on their obligations, while others dabbed in much more 
sophistical rating systems or published annual reference books listing tens of thousands of individuals 
(with their addresses, occupations and candid assessments of their reliability as borrowers). But it is 
these 19th century attempts to collect and commodify information about individuals that laid the 
groundwork for the pervasive national consumer surveillance infrastructure of today.  
This early consumer surveillance was as sophisticated in nature as it was expansive, and it should not be 
written off as primitive or limited in scale. Already before WWII, Lauer reports that financial lives of 
millions Americans were effectively traced, and this information was no longer local but could follow 
individuals as they moved across the nation. What is particularly surprising is that the scale and 
sophistication of this rapidly developing surveillance capacity did not just rival, but, according to Lauer, 
dwarfed that of the nation-state. The book provides evidence that local police departments and 
government agencies often sent requests to credit bureaus for information they sorely needed but 
lacked (p. 179-180). Granted, this may be saying as much about the limited capacities of the US 
government at the time, as it is about the relative power of consumer surveillance industry, but it also 
poignantly illustrates the tight symbiotic relationship between private and public surveillance agencies. 
The book is a comprehensive encyclopedia of the history of consumer credit surveillance in the US, and 
it contains a few surprises even for those with sufficient knowledge about credit reporting. First, Lauer 
shows that collection of credit information was carried out by two different kinds of actors -- specialized 
credit reporting companies on the one hand, and credit departments of retailers who sold on credit on 
the other. Retail credit departments were early (as early as the 1920s) to recognize the importance of 
consumer surveillance not just as a tool of loss prevention, but also as a way to boost or better target 
sales. In contrast, specialized credit bureaus were much more careful and selective in terms of what 
information they sold and to what end, in order to “burnish their reputation for impartiality” and to 
“steer clear of [possible] defamation suits” (p. 175). As a consequence, credit bureaus did not reframe 
themselves as “business builders” (p. 173) and did not move into sales promotions until the postwar 
years. 
Second, particularly surprising at a time when virtually no privacy is left and “any information is credit 
information,” commercial banks shunned credit reporting entirely until late in the 20th century because 
of their strongly held belief in protecting customer privacy (p. 189).  This prevented banks from getting 
in on credit reporting early on, and instead allowing the merchants and the upstarts like Credit Data 
Corporation an advantage and a chance to define the terms and the direction of consumer credit 
surveillance for decades to come.  
Among other surprises is the extent to which the public – and the government – were late to catch on 
the tightening grip of consumer credit surveillance. Up until the 1960s, consumer privacy was not a 
concern for the American public the way it was, for instance, for the 19th century entrepreneurs who 
were frequently outraged by the invasiveness of mercantilist – commercial – credit reporting agencies 
into their private affairs (p. 136). The public has been much more alarmed by the reach of government 
surveillance apparatus (think Snowden) while the elaborate private industry has been growing without 
much pushback. What I also found interesting was that credit reporting and credit scoring were largely 
unrelated until the mid-1980s: credit scoring models were based entirely on the information provided 
on the applications for loans, and not on applicants’ credit history collected by credit bureaus (p. 249). 
That meant that credit scoring was individualized to particular lenders and their borrowers’ populations, 
rather than generic. First general-purpose FICO score was introduced in 1989, once the leading credit 
bureaus accumulated sufficient databases that could be used for statistical analysis. 
Josh Lauer wrote a much more ambitious book than the title may suggest. What he is describing is the 
construction of more than creditworthiness and more than a financial identity, because pervasive data-
gathering reaches far beyond one’s financial behavior, and has bearing on much more than one’s 
borrowing prospects. The Chinese government’s current program to quantify every citizen’s “social 
credit score,” which would be used to access various resources and benefits essential to one’s life’s 
chances (travel abroad, school admissions for one’s children, etc), attests to the sinister possibilities of 
putting the private informational-industrial complex in the service of an authoritarian state.  
A sociologist reader may be frustrated by the lack of serious engagement with theory. But in the book’s 
defense, it was not written by a sociologist, nor is the author unaware of relevant theories. 55-page long 
endnotes contain references to the likes of Carruthers, Granovetter, Espeland and Stevens, Fourcade 
and Healy, Deville and Krippner (as well as Foucault and Giddens), although, admittedly, these are given 
more of a casual nod, than a serious engagement. Lauer also spends much more time on the 19th and 
20th centuries, than he does on the 21st, and he shies away from suggesting any prescriptions. He 
provides a clear diagnosis and, like a skilled investigator, he traces down the problem’s long-standing 
roots leaving no stone unturned. But in the end, the readers are left to grapple with contemporary 
implications on their own. 
“The word credit in the retail business is a sign to a dangerous road that has led many a merchant to 
disaster, but a road which must be travelled” (p. 77). These were the 1904 words of a certain J.E.R 
Chilton, the founder of the Chilton Company, which was to become a leader in the computerization of 
consumer reporting, and eventually purchased by Experian. At the turn of the past century, it was the 
merchants who had no choice but to sell on credit, despite the cost they paid – either in unpaid or 
protracted bills, or in efforts to minimize them. Today, it is the consumers who have no choice but to 
swap access for being surveilled, while the data are used to calibrate their future access through 
“classification situations” (Fourcade and Healy 2013). This engaging and richly documented book will no 
doubt be of great interest to scholars and students of consumer credit, credit surveillance and financial 
identity in the US. 
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